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INTRODUCTION
In arbitration law, few matters engender more stimulating debate than the
interaction of arbitrators and judges with respect to jurisdictional determina-
tions.  When one side asserts that it never agreed to arbitrate, or contests the
arbitrator’s substantive mission or procedural powers, someone must determine
the existence, validity, and/or scope of the arbitration clause.
As a consensual process, arbitration rests on some objective expression of
party assent to waive recourse to otherwise competent courts, either in whole or
in part.  Such assent can raise multiple factual and legal matters.  Does the
conduct of a corporate parent imply consent to arbitrate pursuant to an agree-
ment signed by its subsidiary?  Will an investment treaty give arbitrators
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authority to decide an expropriation claim?  Can arbitrators order consolidation
of cases in a “class action” or make an award of punitive damages?
Weighing the relative costs and benefits of competing paradigms, this
Article makes several modest suggestions with respect to an arbitrator’s power
to rule on his or her own authority.  First, the arbitrator’s right to make jurisdic-
tional rulings remains relatively uncontroversial.  Rather, what remains at stake
is the deference that any such ruling might receive by courts asked to decide the
same question and the timing for their consideration of the matter.  Second,
agreements to submit jurisdictional questions to arbitration should be honored
but not presumed.  Finally, although arguments about timing remain finely bal-
anced, the heavier concerns favor delay of judicial inquiry into arbitral author-
ity until after the award.
I. JURISDICTIONAL BASICS
A. Kompetenz-Kompetenz
Often expressed as Kompetenz-Kompetenz (literally “jurisdiction on juris-
diction”),1 the precept that arbitrators may rule on their own authority possesses
a chameleon-like quality that changes color according to the national and insti-
tutional background of application.2  Less a single rule than a constellation of
related notions, the principle that arbitrators may decide jurisdictional questions
says nothing about who (judge or arbitrator) will ultimately decide any particu-
lar case.  Rather, it is not improper for the arbitrators themselves to address the
existence and extent of their own authority.  After examining the relevant facts
and law, an arbitrator may either decide to hear the case or decline to give the
matter any further consideration.
Moreover, to say that arbitrators may make jurisdictional decisions tells
only part of the story and begs two further questions.  When will courts inter-
vene to consider challenges to arbitral authority?  What finality (if any) will be
accorded to the arbitrator’s decision?
The timing question asks when judges should intervene in the arbitral pro-
cess to monitor possible jurisdictional excess.  If an unhappy respondent denies
1 Normally interchangeable, compe´tence-compe´tence and Kompetenz-Kompetenz often take
their usage by the speaker’s preference for a French or a German formulation. See generally
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 6 (3d ed. forthcoming 2008);
ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
chs. 4 & 5, at 177-274 (1989); Emmanuel Gaillard, L’effet ne´gatif de la compe´tence-compe´-
tence, in ´ETUDES DE PROC ´EDURE ET D’ARBITRAGE EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANC¸OIS
POUDRET 385 (Jacques Haldy, Jean-Marc Rapp & Phidias Ferrari eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Gaillard, Competence]; Pierre Mayer, L’Autonomie de l’arbitre dans l’appre´ciation de sa
propre compe´tence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Acade´mie de droit international de La
Haye 1989); William W. Park, Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, in ICCA CONGRESS
SERIES 13, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Park,
Jurisdiction].
2 When the very existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, the term “arbitrator”
may turn out to be a misnomer.  However, to avoid an unduly heavy style, discussions of
arbitral jurisdiction often speak of “arbitrator” (rather than “alleged arbitrator”) even when
that status remains an open question.  In that context, the term is used for convenience, with
no intent to presume ultimate conclusions on the matter.
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having agreed to arbitrate, a court might be requested to declare the arbitration
clause invalid.  Should a judge entertain a “mid-arbitration” request to stop the
proceedings?  Or should the respondent be required to wait until an award has
been rendered and only then seek vacatur for alleged jurisdictional excess?
Each alternative carries its own risks and opportunities for mischief.
Delay in judicial scrutiny can subject respondents to the expense of unautho-
rized proceedings before overreaching arbitrators.3  However, early access to
courts increases opportunities for dilatory tactics.  In the business world, deter-
mining the scope of arbitration clauses may implicate time-consuming investi-
gations into complex questions of fact and law related to matters such as
agency relationships and the corporate veil.4
The second question relates to the effect that judges should give to arbitra-
tors’ jurisdictional rulings.  In what circumstances (if any) should an arbitra-
tor’s decision on his or her authority be final?
Legal systems differ on whether and when an arbitrator’s decision on his
or her authority should foreclose judicial determination on the matter.  Courts
in the United States will generally accept the litigants’ agreement to have arbi-
tral authority determined by the arbitrators themselves.  Judges must still ask
whether (and to what extent) the parties did indeed give such a role to the
arbitrators.  However, if courts ascertain that the contract confers on arbitrators
the role of jurisdictional decision-makers, the matter is settled.
Other countries (notably Germany5) seem to preclude such agreements to
arbitrate jurisdictional matters.  This approach sacrifices liberty of contract in
order to provide an extra measure of protection against inadvertent loss of the
proverbial day in court.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to distinguish the arbitrator’s right
to rule on jurisdiction from the principle that an arbitration clause remains
autonomous from the main agreement in such it has been encapsulated, often
conceptualized as “separability.”6  The difference between separability and
3 Under some circumstances (depending on the applicable institutional rules and arbitral
situs) the arbitrators may award costs against the losing party, including attorneys’ fees.  Not
always, however, as proven by recent American case law. See CIT Project Fin., LLC v.
Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 600847/03, 2004 WL 2941331, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 17, 2004) (holding an award of attorneys’ fees to be permissible only if explicitly
provided in the parties’ agreement).
4 See, e.g., Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 447 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2006) (govern-
ment manipulation of oil company made it the state’s alter ego); Sarhank Group v. Oracle
Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 2005) (parent should not arbitrate pursuant to arbitration
clause signed by subsidiary); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 143 (1st Cir. 2003)
(litigation between two parent entities, neither of which had signed arbitration clause, with
one side seeking a plaintiff-friendly court).
5 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
6 In the United States, the autonomy of the arbitration clause was established in the
landmark Prima Paint decision, where the purchaser of a paint business alleged “fraud in the
inducement” in an attempt to have the contract rescinded in an action in court rather than
before the bargained-for arbitral tribunal.  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).  The separability of the arbitration clause permitted the fraud
charge to be addressed on its merits by the arbitrator.  The principle was affirmed in Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), in the context of a consumer dispute
heard in state court and involving an alleged violation of state statute.  This classic separabil-
ity case involved a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction based on the alleged invalidity of a loan
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Kompetenz-Kompetenz might be illustrated by reference to an arbitration clause
included in a marketing agreement by which a consultant agreed to help an
American corporation obtain a public works contract in the Ruritania.  In a
subsequent dispute, it might be alleged that (i) the person who signed the agree-
ment for the American corporation was not authorized to do so and (ii) the
consulting agreement was void because the payments were earmarked in part to
bribe government officials.  Separability would permit the arbitrators to find the
main contract void for illegality without destroying their power under the arbi-
tration clause to do so.  However, some notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz would
be required to permit the arbitrators to decide (on either an interim or a final
basis) whether the individual who signed the agreement was authorized to bind
the corporation.
B. An Anti-Sabotage Mechanism
In its most primitive form, the principle that arbitrators may rule on their
jurisdiction serves as a measure to protect against having an arbitration derailed
before it begins.  The arbitral tribunal (and/or the relevant arbitral institution)
need not halt the proceedings just because one side questions its authority.  The
principle reduces the prospect that proceedings will be derailed through a sim-
ple allegation that an arbitration clause is unenforceable.
The rule is not foolproof, of course, given the eternal ingenuity with which
fools often acquit themselves.  Recalcitrant parties can still mount troublesome
court challenges (even if not ultimately successful) designed to slow the train.
However, the principle does avoid conceptual barriers to arbitration that would
exist if legal systems considered jurisdictional powers of judges and of arbitra-
tors to be mutually exclusive.
Although most countries accept that a jurisdictional objection does not
automatically stop an arbitration, little consensus exists on other aspects of an
arbitrator’s ruling on his or her authority.  An arbitrator’s jurisdictional power
(at least in commercial arbitration7) derives largely from national law and insti-
tutional rules8  While commentators sometimes refer to “the internationally rec-
agreement.  Had the view of the state court prevailed, the arbitrators would have had no
power to consider their own jurisdiction since the allegedly invalid loan agreement would
have been inseparably linked to the arbitration clause. See generally Alan Scott Rau, Sepa-
rability in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1; Adam
Samuel, Separability and the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22
ARB. INT’L 477 (2006).
7 A different regime obtains for investment arbitration under the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules (“ICSID Rules”), under which awards are subject
to review not by national courts, but by an internal annulment process. See Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 52,
March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1290, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 192 (1966) [hereinafter ICSID
Rules].  Treaty foundations also exist for other supranational adjudicatory bodies, such as the
European Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice, and the European Court on
Human Rights.
8 For institutional incarnations of the principle, see, for example, U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules art. 21 (1998); American Arbi-
tration Association (“AAA”) International Arbitration Rules art. 15 (2000); ICSID Rules,
supra note 7, at art. 41; International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Rules of Arbitration
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ognized doctrine” of Kompetenz-Kompetenz,9 it would be more accurate to
speak of doctrines in the plural.
To illustrate, if German courts are asked to hear a matter which one side
asserts is subject to arbitration, they decide immediately on the validity and
scope of the arbitration agreement.10  In neighboring France, such challenges
normally wait until an award has been made.11  Across the Channel in England,
litigants have a right to declaratory decisions on arbitral authority, but only if
they take no part in the arbitration.12  In Sweden13 and in Finland,14 as in the
United States,15 courts may entertain applications for jurisdictional declarations
at any time.
In Switzerland, courts asked to appoint an arbitrator will normally apply a
prima facie standard in deciding whether the arbitration clause is valid but
engage in full consideration of jurisdiction (at least as to law) in the context of
award review.16  American courts, however, may order full examination of the
validity of an arbitration clause at any stage of the arbitral process to determine
whether, as a matter of fact and law, the parties have indeed agreed to
arbitrate.17
The United States generally permits parties to give arbitrators the final
word on some aspects of arbitral power.18  A similar result would seem to
obtain in Finland.19  In other countries, however, the effect of such agreements
remains far from clear.
C. Judicial Intervention:  When and to What Extent?
1. Timing
From the perspective of any national legal system, the first inquiry with
respect to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional ruling concerns the timing of judicial
intervention.  Paradigms range from the American approach (courts may inter-
vene at any moment) to the French model (courts wait until after an award is
rendered).  The difference becomes significant when one side to the dispute
art. 6 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Rules]; London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”)
Rules art. 23 (1998).
9 Compare DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT § 13.23, at 392 (2005), with Laurent Le´vy, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by
Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 115, 117 (Emman-
uel Gaillard ed., 2005) (suggesting that “in upholding their jurisdiction, arbitrators implicitly
declare that any other court . . . is prevented from ruling on the same matter”).
10 Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] § 1032(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter ZPO].
11 Nouveau code de proce´dure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 1458 (Fr.) [hereinafter N.C.P.C.]; see
also discussion infra note 21.
12 English Arbitration Act § 72 (1996).
13 Swedish Arbitration Act § 2 (1999), discussed in Kaj Hobe´r, Arbitration Reform in Swe-
den, 17 ARB. INT’L 351, 357-358 (2001).
14 Petri Taivalkoski, Le nouveau droit finlandais de l’arbitrage international, in
RECHERCHE SUR L’ARBITRAGE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPAR ´E 126 (1997).
15 See infra notes 17, 28, 47 and accompanying text.
16 Loi fe´de´rale sur de droit international prive´ (“LDIP”) arts. 7 & 179(3) (1989) (Switz.).
17 See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
18 See discussion of First Options, infra note 83.
19 Gustaf Mo¨ller, The Arbitration Agreement, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION IN
FINLAND 7 (Mika Savola ed., Finnish Arb. Ass’n 2004).
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makes application to a court with supervisory (curial) competence over the
arbitration, asking that the proceedings be stopped or that a case be heard not-
withstanding an alleged arbitration clause.
Between these two extremes, many legal systems provide hybrid timing
solutions that vary according to the specific posture in which arbitral jurisdic-
tion has been challenged.  One standard might apply when a legal action is
brought in respect of matters purportedly referred to arbitration.  Another stan-
dard might pertain to motions for declaratory judicial determination of prelimi-
nary jurisdictional questions.  Distinctions might be made depending on
whether the applicant has or has not taken part in the arbitration.
2. Effect of an Arbitrator’s Determination
The other question to be considered by any arbitral re´gime relates to the
effect of an arbitration agreement on jurisdictional questions.  A legal system
might take the position that all arbitral decisions on jurisdiction may be
reviewed de novo by the appropriate court.20  However, such is not the only
option, or even the most sensible one.  An alternative would be for courts to ask
what jurisdictional matters the parties agreed the arbitrator would decide and to
defer accordingly.
Each choice presents its own risks, requiring lawmakers to navigate
between policy dangers much as Odysseus had to sail between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis.  If courts may defer to arbitrators on jurisdictional matters, intellectual
sloppiness (or a desire to clear dockets) might lead judges to accept mere con-
tract recitals rather than to engage in rigorous inquiry into what the parties
really meant.  The other risk lies in undue rigidity, precluding recognition even
of the litigants’ clearly expressed wishes for finality in arbitral determinations
about jurisdiction issues.
In systems where courts may defer to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determi-
nation, judges must still examine arbitral authority.  However, the analysis
takes place at a different level, asking whether the parties intended an arbitrator
to have the last word on a particular jurisdictional issue.  The pertinent question
is what the contract provides.  Courts must examine the facts of each case as
they bear on the parties’ pre-dispute expectations.  If (and only if) the litigants
intended arbitration of a particular jurisdictional question, the matter would be
given to the arbitrator for ultimate disposition.
3. Review Standards
Differences in national law relate not only to when and whether courts
may address arbitral jurisdiction, but also to the standards of review applied
when they do examine the validity of the arbitration clause.  The most signifi-
cant dividing line relates to whether the judge will make a full inquiry into the
parties’ intent, or simply a summary examination, applying what is sometimes
called a prima facie standard.
20 In most cases, courts will have the last word on jurisdiction, rendering misplaced the
fretting about arbitrators’ “unfettered discretion” such as evidenced in Ottley v. Sheepshead
Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 898 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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For example, a seller might bring a judicial action to collect the price of an
engine.  In response, the buyer (who alleges the engine was defective) might
move to stay litigation, asserting that the parties had agreed to arbitrate their
dispute.  The seller might reply with allegations that the arbitration clause was
void.
In the alternative, the buyer might file an arbitration for product malfunc-
tion, alleging an engine explosion that caused personal injury and loss of prof-
its.  Here it would be the seller (preferring to be in court) who asks a judge to
address the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, perhaps arguing
that the person who signed the clause lacked authority or that the clause was
not broad enough to cover the tort action for personal injury or the financial
claim for lost profits.
In either instance, judges will need to decide whether to examine arbitral
jurisdiction in depth or to do so under a summary (prima facie) standard.  In the
latter event, they would leave fuller review to the time after an award has been
rendered.
In France, until an award had been rendered, judges address the validity
and scope of an arbitration clause only in the most superficial manner and only
in the event no arbitral tribunal has been constituted.21  The court can ask
whether the clause was clearly void (for example, whether the arbitration clause
exists at all) but may not address more complex questions, such as whether the
corporate officer signing the arbitration agreement had authority to do so.
Once arbitration has started, however, judges sit on their hands until the award
is made.22
By contrast, in the United States courts may engage in full examination of
arbitral power regardless of whether the arbitration has begun, and irrespective
of whether they are being asked to hear the merits of the claims.  The court
might decide that the lawsuit should stop and the arbitration should proceed.
Or vice versa.  The court might also pass this jurisdictional question back to the
arbitrators themselves for their determination.23
21 N.C.P.C., supra note 11, at art. 1458 (permitting pre-arbitration review only to determine
if the arbitration clause is “clearly void” (manifestement nulle)).  The statute provides:
When a dispute which has been brought before an arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration
agreement is brought before a governmental court, the court must declare itself without jurisdic-
tion.  If the dispute has not yet been brought before the arbitral tribunal, the court must also
declare itself without jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is clearly void.
(Author’s translation.)  Standards for judicial review are contained in other provisions, for
example article 1502 for international arbitration.
22 For a recent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court opting for the minimum standard of
review at the time an arbitration begins, see Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consom-
mateurs, [2007] S.C.R. 34 (Can.).  The Canadian decision interpreted the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law as enacted in Que´bec.  Unlike the French
statute, however, the Model Law permits judicial intervention even after an arbitration has
commenced. See generally Fre´de´ric Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Full
or Prima Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction?, 22 ARB. INT’L 463 (2006).
23 In some countries, courts distinguish between arbitration held at home or abroad.  Swiss
courts, for example, make a comprehensive review of the validity of the arbitration clause
when the arbitration has its seat abroad.  By contrast, when the arbitration is held in Switzer-
land, judges engage only in a summary examination of arbitral jurisdiction (examen som-
maire) delaying fuller review until the award stage. Compare Swiss Tribunal fe´de´ral
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As a general matter, a prima facie standard would be relevant only with
respect to pre-award requests for declarations and injunctions, which implicate
a prophylactic role for courts in the sense of preventing an arbitrator from mak-
ing an unauthorized decision.  The jurisdictional foundation of an arbitral pro-
ceeding must be monitored before anyone knows what the arbitrator will
decide.  The arbitrator’s jurisdiction becomes an issue because judges are asked
to make a respondent participate, or to tell a claimant that the arbitration lacks
jurisdictional foundation.24
By contrast, when arbitral jurisdiction becomes an issue in the endgame,
after an award is rendered, judges exercise a remedial function, correcting mis-
takes that allegedly occurred earlier in the arbitral process.  The validity of an
award might be subject to judicial scrutiny at the arbitral seat, through motions
to vacate or to confirm under local law,25 or to recognize an award rendered
abroad under the New York Arbitration Convention.26  At this point, a different
set of concerns present themselves, calling for a deeper judicial scrutiny of both
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the relevant public policy implications of the
award.
D. Three Contexts for Jurisdictional Rulings
When questions are raised about the validity or scope of a particular arbi-
tration clause, one option would be for the arbitration to stop automatically,
until matters have been clarified by a judge.  It is against this extreme position,
which denies arbitrators any right at all to rule on their own authority, that
lawyers most often invoke the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle.  If a
legal system does allow the arbitration to proceed in the face of a jurisdictional
challenge, the story could unfold in several ways.  At least three different
approaches might be envisaged.
1. No Automatic Stop to the Arbitration
Under the first hypothesis, the arbitrator’s right to make jurisdictional rul-
ings operates in tandem with a principle allowing judges to examine an arbitra-
tor’s jurisdiction before an award has been rendered.27  The arbitrators might
decisions in Fondation M. v. Banque X, ATF 122 III 139 (Apr. 29, 1996) (arbitration in
Switzerland), with Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v. MSC Mediterranean Ship-
ping Co. SA, ATF 121 III 38 (Jan. 16, 1995) (arbitration abroad).
24 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) provides that courts may compel arbitration “upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue.”
25 9 U.S.C. § 10 permits vacatur of an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”
26 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 38.  For an award found subject to neither the domestic nor the international
enforcement scheme, see International Bechtel Co. v. Department of Civil Aviation of
Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005).  For a case implicating both a national statute
and the New York Convention, see Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 126
F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997).
27 In this regard, it is important not to confuse the allocation of tasks between courts and
arbitrators with the repartition of functions between arbitrators and a private supervisory
institution.  For example, under the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, the ICC Court might be “prima facie satisfied” that an arbitration agreement exists,
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offer an opinion on the limits of their own authority but without in any way
restricting the court’s consideration of the same question.
Although the arbitration does not necessarily stop, neither does any related
judicial action.  Courts proceed pursuant to whatever motions might be availa-
ble under local law.  In some countries, courts may step in from day one, at any
time in almost any circumstance.28  In others, courts might have full power to
address arbitral jurisdiction in the context of lawsuits on the merits of the claim,
but only limited margin to maneuver through declaratory judgments.29
The arbitrator’s right to rule on jurisdiction holds significant practical
value (at least for the party wishing to arbitrate) notwithstanding the possibility
of court intervention.  A recalcitrant respondent cannot bring the proceedings to
a halt just by challenging jurisdiction.  Moreover, whether courts ultimately
substitute their own views for those of the arbitrators depends on the facts of
each case.  In some instances a judge might order the proceedings suspended,
either permanently or until the jurisdictional facts have been determined.30  In
others, the arbitration clause may be found to be robust enough to cover the
controverted dispute.31
2. Giving Arbitrators the First Word
A second context in which arbitrators make jurisdictional rulings requires
courts to refrain from entertaining any jurisdictional motions until after an
award has been rendered.  The arbitrators would then have the first word on
jurisdiction.  Recourse to judicial action must await the end of arbitration.  This
version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz lays down rules about the stages in the arbi-
tral process at which judges may intervene.  The positive part of the principle
addresses itself to arbitrators, permitting them to decide challenges to their own
authority.  The so-called “negative effect” of the principle speaks to courts,32
telling the judge to wait until arbitration ends before inquiring about the valid-
ity or effect of an arbitration clause.
Under French law, if an arbitrator has already begun to hear a matter,
courts must decline to hear the case.  The judge has a limited jurisdiction to
hear a case only if the arbitration has not begun and only if the alleged arbitra-
tion agreement is found to be clearly void (manifestement nulle).33
thus permitting any jurisdictional challenge of a deeper nature goes to the arbitrators.  This
does not mean, however, that national courts will be deprived of power to make jurisdic-
tional determinations when asked to stay litigation, enjoin arbitration, or vacate an award.
28 See Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991)
(courts determine whether contracts are void because of signatory’s lack of power to bind
principals); see also Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000) (jury to
determine whether party agreed to arbitrate); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d
903 (Cal. 1997) (malpractice claim against health care provider referred to ad hoc arbitration
that left administration to the parties rather than independent institution; habitual delays in
the process found to constitute evidence of fraud by health care provider).
29 See ZPO, supra note 10, § 1032(2).
30 See Sandvik, 220 F.3d 99; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31 See discussion infra note 99 of PacifiCare v. Book.
32 Gaillard, Competence, supra note 1.  The “negative effect” might be considered as part of
the arsenal of doctrinal tools to combat dilatory tactics of a party wishing to sabotage the
proceedings.
33 N.C.P.C., supra note 11, at art. 1458.
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At issue here is the timing, rather than the extent, of judicial review.
Going to court at the beginning of the proceedings can save expense for a
defendant improperly joined to the arbitration.  On the other hand, judicial
resources may be conserved by delaying review until the end of the process, by
which time the parties might have settled.
3. The Arbitrator’s Decision is Final
The third context in which arbitrators might rule on their own authority
involves judicial deference to the finality of an arbitrator’s decision about his or
her own authority.  The arbitrator gets the last word as well as the first, assum-
ing that judges first determine that the parties did in fact agree to such
finality.34
a. American Doctrine:  Arbitrability for the Arbitrator
Regardless of when judges entertain motions on arbitral jurisdiction, the
parties might consent, expressly or impliedly, to subject the jurisdictional ques-
tion to arbitration.  As discussed below, case law in the United States often
characterizes such consent as an agreement on “the arbitrabiltiy question” by
which the parties’ agreement transforms the jurisdictional difference into a dis-
puted question of fact or law, of which the substantive merits the litigants sub-
mit to final determination by an arbitrator.
The application of this line of reasoning will in all events depend on the
facts of each case.  In some instances, the parties may indeed have agreed to
submit a jurisdictional question to final and binding arbitration.  In other
instances, an assertion that they have done so will be preposterous, unable to
withstand analysis.  The parties’ agreement, determined on a case-by-case
basis, will determine which conclusion makes sense.  In each instance, the
judges will ask this question:  What did the parties intend to submit to
arbitration?
Giving arbitrators the last word on jurisdictional questions means that
some litigants may well lose their access to court.  The peril derives not so
much from isolated mistakes, whether by arbitrators or by courts, but from the
risk that an overburdened judiciary might fall into a systematic proclivity
toward granting jurisdictional authority to arbitrators, even when contracts are
ambiguous on the matter.  By contrast, a judicial monopoly on ultimate resolu-
tion of jurisdictional questions restricts party autonomy, particularly among
sophisticated business managers.  The result is a serious limit on the liberty of
contract that has long bolstered healthy commercial transactions.
b. German Doctrine:  Then and Now
Prior to Germany’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1998,
court decisions had recognized that an arbitral tribunal might be granted the
power to rule on its own jurisdiction pursuant to a specific clause, accepted by
both parties, that implicitly dispensed with subsequent judicial review.  In a
34 Depending on the legal system, judicial proceedings to address the finality of the arbitra-
tor’s ruling could take place either before or after the award had been rendered.  This ques-
tion of timing would be a separate issue from the matter of finality.
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landmark decision, Germany’s highest court, the Bundesgerichtshof, had
decided that the parties to a commercial contract could submit the question of
arbitral authority to final and binding arbitration.35  What the court called a
Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Klausel, or “jurisdiction on jurisdiction clause,” was
deemed sufficient to insulate the arbitrator’s decision on the matter from judi-
cial scrutiny.
Currently, the prevailing opinion in Germany (both scholarly and judicial)
seems to hold that such Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are invalid.  Germany
case law has held that the parties may not restrict judges from examining arbi-
tral jurisdiction in the context of challenges to either interim or final awards.36
Whether such a position constitutes sound doctrine remains open to debate, as
discussed later.
c. The American “Arbitrability Question”
In the United States, a clear line of judicial pronouncements holds that in
some situations arbitrators may rule on their own powers without subsequent de
novo review by courts.  Such grants of jurisdictional power are not legal fic-
tions, but require evidence of the parties’ real intent expressed in concrete lan-
guage.  Absent an express or implied waiver of the right to go to court, a
litigant will not normally be denied recourse to otherwise competent tribunals.
However, once such a waiver has been established, in the form of an agreement
to arbitrate the question of arbitral authority, the party will not be permitted to
renege on this bargain to arbitrate.
Jurists from outside the United States may find the terminology unfamil-
iar.  Court decisions speak of the “arbitrability question” in the same way that
the rest of the world refers to a jurisdictional issue.  If an “arbitrability ques-
tion” has been submitted to arbitration, then courts defer to the arbitrator on the
matter.  After the “arbitrability” decisions have been decorticated, one finds
that judges in the United States have been using the same conceptual frame-
work as the old German cases on Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses.
In this context, one might recall how the middle-aged cloth merchant in
Molie`re’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme learned, much to his delight, that he had
actually been speaking prose all along, without ever being aware of this rhetori-
cal skill.37  The difference, however, is that courts in the United States seem
35 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 5, 1977, 68 Entsheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 356 (358) (F.R.G.).
36 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan 13, 2005, III ZR 265/03.
See generally commentary on that case in Stephan Wilske & Claudia Krapfl, A Final Fare-
well to the German Concept of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 2 IDR 93 (2005). See also Stefan
Kro¨ll & Peter Kraft, Ten Years of UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 1 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REV. 439, 452-457 (2007).
37 JEAN-BAPTISTE POQUELIN (MOLI `ERE), LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, Act II, Scene 4
(1670).  Monsieur Jourdain, a nouveau riche draper, has hired a philosophy teacher to
increase his oratorical skill.  On learning that language, which is not poetry is prose, the
newly enlightened merchant exclaims with amazement and pride, “Par ma foi! il y a plus de
quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j’en susse rien.”  (“My Lord! For more than forty
years I have been saying prose without knowing anything at all of the matter.”). (Author’s
translation).
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happily oblivious to the link between American legal notions and the doctrines
elaborated in the rest of the world to meet similar juridical problems.
The American approach asks not only “who decides what,” but also “who
decides who decides.”38  Depending on what the parties agreed, an otherwise
jurisdictional matter (normally for courts) may be transformed into the substan-
tive merits in the arbitration itself, for the arbitrators to decide.  If the parties
agreed to entrust to the arbitrator an adjudication of jurisdictional disputes (for
example, eligibility requirements for arbitration), then the arbitrator’s word
would normally be final on that matter.
When the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate is disputed, courts
generally refuse to compel arbitration until they resolve whether the arbitration
clause exists,39 which may be determined by a jury.40  However, when ques-
tions relate to the scope of an otherwise valid arbitration clause, American
judges show a willingness to defer to the arbitrators’ jurisdictional decisions,
assuming the parties submitted the matter to arbitration in their contract.
The American approach might well be illustrated by the federal court of
appeals decision in Alliance Bernstein Investment v. Schaffran41 where a for-
mer employee of a New York hedge fund alleged wrongful termination, claim-
ing dismissal motivated by cooperation with government investigations into the
employer’s wrongdoing.42
The employment relationship was subject to rules of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), which provided for arbitration, except
with respect to claims of discrimination.43  The arbitrator’s authority thus
depended on whether the claim could be characterized as an “allegation of dis-
crimination” within the meaning of rules.
The court did not see its role as deciding whether the arbitrator possessed
jurisdiction to hear the claim.44  Rather, the question was who (judge or an
arbitrator) would decide whether the allegations of termination for “whistle
blowing” amounted to the type of discrimination claim that was carved out of
the scope of the arbitration clause.
38 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
287 (1999); see also discussion of First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, infra note 83.
39 See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
40 China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 282 (3d
Cir. 2003).
41 Alliance Bernstein Inv. Res. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
Contrary to the suggestion by some commentators, this case seems to be focused on jurisdic-
tion from a contractual perspective, not subject matter arbitrability in the public policy sense.
Compare note in 17 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 171, 172 (2006).
42 The former employee asserted that his employer had violated the “whistle-blower” provi-
sions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2000).
43 NASD R. 10201(b) provides that “[a] claim alleging employment discrimination . . . in
violation of a statute is not required to be arbitrated” unless the parties have explicitly agreed
to arbitration of the discrimination action either before or after the dispute arose.  In other
words, the submission of a discrimination claim must be specific, rather than covered in a
broad “blanket” arbitration clause covering disputes in general.
44 The claim of non-arbitrability related to the scope of a contract provision (NASD R.
10201), not any public policy limits on arbitration of “whistle-blower” claims.  If public
policy had been at issue, the result would likely have been different.
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Reading the NASD Rules and contract language in the context of the par-
ties’ employment relationship, the court determined that the question of
whether “whistle blower” claims were arbitrable was for the arbitrators them-
selves.  The consequence was that the arbitrators’ finding on that matter would
normally be insulated from review for “[excess of] powers” under the Federal
Arbitration Act.45
Reasonable people, of course, might argue about what the parties had in
mind when they made their bargain.  However, these debatable matters of fact
do not call into question the jurisdictional principle that the parties to a dispute
may empower arbitrators to decide controversies about the pre-conditions to
arbitration.
E. Paradigms and Policy
Fixing the point in time for court intervention involves a relatively clear
(albeit difficult) choice between costs and benefits related to the expenditure of
either public or private resources.  One model suggests that a party may go to
court at any moment for the purpose of contesting arbitral power.  Another
paradigm, however, provides for court challenge of arbitral authority only after
an award is rendered.
Court challenges to jurisdiction at the beginning of the process can save
time and expense for the litigants.  If a judge finds the alleged arbitral clause to
be void, or too narrow in scope to cover the dispute, then neither side need
waste time or money in arbitration.  By contrast, delaying judicial review until
after the award has been rendered can preserve government funds.  The arbitra-
tors may get it right, or the case may settle.46
If questions of authority are left to the end game, perhaps there will not
even be a jurisdictional challenge in court.  The case might settle, or the party
resisting arbitration might prevail.  And if the matter does go to court, the arbi-
trator may have done much of the intellectual heavy lifting, sorting facts and
law to provide the reviewing judge a helpful analytic roadmap.
American arbitration law traditionally has given parties a right to raise a
matter of arbitral authority at any time, whether before or after the award.  Such
45 9 U.S.C. § 10(4) (2000).  Of course, the award might well be attacked on jurisdictional
grounds derived from other factual allegations.  For example, the arbitrator would lack
authority if the person who signed was not authorized to do so, or, the signature had been
compelled by a gun at the head or was forged.  But the decision on jurisdiction over the
“whistle-blower” claim could not be disregarded because a judge later disagreed with the
arbitrator’s interpretation of the rules.
46 In the United States, analogous concerns about economy of judicial resources impose
restraints on appeal of interlocutory court decisions. See Federal Arbitration Act § 16, 9
U.S.C. § 16.  See also the discussion of the “collateral order” doctrine in Lauro Lines S.R.L.
v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989), and Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511
U.S. 863 (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (involving appeal when an order
involves “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 2121 v. Good-
rich Corp., 410 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2005); ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s, Inc., 280 F.3d
1091 (6th Cir. 2002); Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2002).
For conversations on this topic, thanks are due to Ward Farnsworth, Gary Lawson, and
Louise Ellen Teitz.
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determinations would usually be made pursuant to litigation under sections 3
and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, providing for stay of court litigation and
orders to compel arbitration.47  This approach means that a party who never
agreed to arbitrate will not need to waste time and money in a proceeding that
lacks an authoritative foundation.  Moreover, either side can request clarifica-
tion about the scope of the arbitrator’s power before substantial sums are spent
needlessly.  The prospect of award vacatur on jurisdictional grounds cannot be
excluded, but it may be less likely to hang as a Sword of Damocles in cases of
obvious jurisdictional defect.
By contrast, the French model delays court consideration of jurisdictional
matters until the award review stage.  This approach reduces the prospect of
dilatory tactics designed to derail an arbitration.  A bad-faith respondent will be
less able to add the cost of a court challenge at the same time that the arbitra-
tion is going forward.48
Another benefit from the French paradigm lies in its potential for higher
quality jurisdictional review by judges, who will be able to benefit from the
arbitrators’ earlier consideration of the matter.  And government resources may
be conserved for the simple reason that a settlement might obviate the need for
judicial review.
A cynic, of course, might note that the French rule can have practical
advantages for arbitrators themselves, who will not be declared incompetent
until after collecting their fees.  But as Rudyard Kipling might have written,
that is another story.
II. TAXONOMY:  WHAT IS A JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION?
A. Existence, Scope, and Public Policy
In practice, an arbitrator’s right to decide a question will often depend on
how that question is characterized by the reviewing court.  Labeling matters as
“jurisdictional” puts them into the realm where judges would normally expect
to exercise some scrutiny, depending on the circumstances of the case and the
approach of the relevant legal system.
To reduce the risk of simply presuming one’s own conclusions about what
is or is not jurisdictional, it might be helpful to suggest three common catego-
ries of defects in arbitral authority:  (i) existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement; (ii) scope of authority (substantive and procedural); and (iii) public
47 See generally Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1991).  In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), and Vimar Segu-
ros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995), judges determined arbitral
jurisdiction at the outset of the process, rather than waiting to see what the arbitrators would
decide.  See also the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (2003), and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
48 N.C.P.C., supra note 11, at art. 1458.  For a recent case of the Cour de Cassation inter-
preting the French version of compe´tence-compe´tence in the context of an ICC arbitration,
see SARI Me´tu System France, Cass. 1re civ., Dec. 1, 1999, holding that only the clear
nullity of an arbitration agreement would bar application of the principle by which an arbi-
trator was permitted to rule on his own jurisdiction.
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policy.  There is no magic in this tripartite classification, which commends
itself only as a starting point for analysis.
The first two flaws relate to the contours of the parties’ contract.  The third
derives from public policy, regardless of what the parties might have agreed.
Each poses its own analytic framework.
1. Existence and Validity
With respect to the very existence of the arbitration clause, it will be
highly unlikely that an arbitrator can make a final jurisdictional ruling.  Any
enforcement forum will want to make sure that the party against whom the
award is invoked did in fact agree to arbitrate.  In many countries, however, the
arbitrator could make an initial interpretation of whether the non-signatory was
bound to arbitrate49 but would not have the last word on the matter.  A final
determination would be possible only pursuant to a second agreement legiti-
mately concluded by the party sought to be bound.  Such a result has been
accepted in some legal systems50 but not others.51
Determinations related to the existence or validity of the arbitration clause
implicate the following common questions:  agency (actual or implied),52
waiver of right to arbitrate (for example, by initiation of court litigation or
undue delay53), survival of an arbitration clause after assignment,54 and limita-
tion periods.55  It might be asserted that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate
because of alleged forgery, fraud or duress, or lack of authority by the individ-
ual who executed the contract.56
49 See survey of national jurisdictions in Park, Jurisdiction, supra note 1.
50 See Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pak. Ministry of Food & Agric. (The Emmanuel
Colocotronis) [1982] (No. 2), 1 W.L.R. 1096, 1 All E.R. 823 (Eng.) (disagreement on
whether charter party terms incorporated into a bill of lading).
51 See discussion of the German BGH decision of 13 January 2005, supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
52 See, for example, Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, where an
arbitral tribunal had to determine whether the government of Egypt was bound by an arbitra-
tion clause in an investment contract concluded by an Egyptian state-owned corporation but
also initialed by a government minister with the ambiguous words “approved, agreed and
ratified.”  S. Pac. Props., Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Cour de cassation, Judgment of
Jan. 6, 1987, Cass. civ. lre, 1987 J.D.I. (Clunet) 469 (with commentary by Ph. Leboulanger)
(Fr.), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1004 (E. Gaillard trans. 1987).
53 See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 1995).
54 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995); see also discussion infra
note 96.
55 See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that six
year time limit for bringing claim under NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure was a ques-
tion for arbitrator to decide); Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d
1308 (N.Y. 1995) (statute of limitations questions must be resolved by courts; New York law
not pre-empted by Federal Arbitration Act).
56 See Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991)
(concerning securities law violations brought by government entities against investment
company); see also Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997);
Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992) (forgery). Compare
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001), with Sandvik AB
v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). See generally BERNARD HANOTIAU,
COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS (2005).
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An attempt might be made to bring a non-signatory corporation into the
proceedings on the basis of conduct that implied consent to an arbitration com-
mitment of an affiliate.57  Or an assertion might be made that the corporate veil
should be pierced on a ground such as undercapitalization.
The process for constitution of the arbitral tribunal also affects arbitral
power.  If the parties agreed to arbitration by a tribunal appointed by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, there is no basis to oblige the defendant to
participate in an arbitration convened by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion.58  Interpreting the parties’ intent as to the constitution of the arbitral tribu-
nal becomes particularly problematic when courts are called to repair
pathological clauses lacking particulars about the arbitral situs or institutional
rules.59
2. Scope
By contrast, the arbitrator’s authority to address problems of scope might
often be addressed in the initial arbitration clause itself.  At the time of con-
cluding their transaction, foresighted parties could give arbitrators explicit
power to adjudicate, in a final way, challenges to the extent of their powers and
the range of matters covered by the arbitration clause.  The timing for chal-
lenge, however, remains a question separate from the effect of the jurisdictional
decision and the parties’ intention in that regard.
Frequently invoked questions of scope relate to the substantive and proce-
dural limits of an arbitration clause or involve arbitral jurisdiction over tort
claims and statutory causes of action (such as competition law), the arbitrators’
application of a particular governing law,60 or alleged disregard of certain con-
tractual limits on their authority.61  An arbitrator might be asked to decide sub-
stantive questions, which one side asserts were never submitted to arbitration.62
57 See ICC Award No. 4131 of 1982 (Dow Chemical v. Isover St. Gobain) permitting join-
der of non-signatories on the basis of the so-called “group of companies” doctrine.  The
award can be found in 1 COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, at 146
[RECUEIL DES SENTENCES ARBITRALES DE LA CCI, 1974-1985] (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Der-
ains eds., 1990); 110 J. DROIT INT’L 899 (1983) (Fr.).  The award was upheld by the Paris
Cour d’appel, 21 October 1983, 1984 Rev. arb. 98.  English language extracts in 9 YEAR-
BOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (1984).
58 For an analogous problem, see Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Repub-
lic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Geneva Office des Poursuites, 26 I.L.M. 382
(1987).
59 See, e.g., Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GMBH & Co. v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.
2006); Jain v. de Me´re´, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995); Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987).  In Presstek, the contract between German and American
entities provided only for “arbitration in the Hague under the International Arbitration rules.”
455 F.3d at 9.
60 For example, arbitrators who apply provisions of United States antitrust law, notwith-
standing the merchants’ agreement that the contract shall be subject to the laws of another
country, might exceed their jurisdiction, unless the mandatory norms of the United States (as
place of performance) preempt the contractually-designated law. See Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
61 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Indon., Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indon.) Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
62 See Wachovia Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt, 445 F.3d 762 (4th Cir. 2006).  In an action
against a bank for bad financial and tax advice, an arbitration clause in a loan agreement was
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Or it might be asserted that certain remedies such as attorneys’ fees or punitive
damages fall outside the arbitrator’s mission.
The arbitrators’ procedural powers constitute a particularly fertile ground
for jurisdictional conflict.  Did the parties authorize the arbitrators to consoli-
date two proceedings?  Did the parties give arbitrators the right to punish a
party for failing to produce documents or to award compound interest?
3. Public Policy
Violations of public policy, of course, may defeat arbitral jurisdiction
regardless of the parties’ wishes, at least within the forum whose norms have
been offended.  These public policy limits might relate to matters that the rele-
vant legal system (asked to enforce either the agreement to arbitrate or the
resulting award) says may not be arbitrated.  Or pubic policy might be impli-
cated by an award giving effect to illegal conduct that the forum does not wish
to condone.63
An arbitrator may lack authority not only due to the absence of the parties’
mutual consent, but also because legal systems sometimes draw boundaries
around an arbitrator’s power to protect sensitive public norms that affect all of
society.  The restrictions on arbitral power often take the form of limits on
subjects that may generally not be arbitrated (such as the prohibition on arbitra-
tion of competition law claims64) or for a specific case.65
In the United States, consumer and employment transactions present spe-
cial public policy wrinkles.  Unlike many countries, no general national statute
serves to protect consumers and employees against abusive arbitration agree-
ments.66  To a large extent, this American exceptionalism finds its roots in yet
held not to bar a lawsuit for fraudulently inducing the investor’s tax shelter participation.
Compare Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006), where a tax shelter sponsor
was held bound to arbitrate on the basis of an arbitration clause in a brokerage contract
related to the tax shelter transaction. See also Vassalluzzo v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 06-
4215-BLS2, 2007 WL 2076471 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 21, 2007).  In this malpractice action
for advice on an unsuccessful tax shelter, the arbitration clause in a 2001 engagement letter
was found to cover some but not all transactions.
63 An arbitrator would not likely be permitted to render an award giving effect to a sale of
illegal arms to terrorists or ordering payment for slaves or heroine.  Nor would an arbitrator
be permitted to reinstate a pilot dismissed from employment for showing up drunk at the
cockpit.
64 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.  For a case interpreting Mitsubishi in the context of an
award that allegedly disregarded mandatory antitrust norms, see Baxter International, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003).
65 For an example of a public policy limit applicable to a particular dispute rather than an
entire subject matter, see United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  The
case involved indictment of former partners of the KPMG accounting firm, accused of con-
spiracy and tax evasion in connection with abusive tax shelters. Id. at 237.  The partners
asserted that by contract KPMG must advance the legal fees incurred for their defense, a
claim that the firm argued must be arbitrated pursuant to the partnership agreement. Id. at
239-60.  The judge in the tax case held that arbitration of the legal fees issue would violate
public policy, positing that arbitration involves “unpredictable timing and the likelihood of
delay” and thus would force the court to do violence to important public interests. Id. at 255.
66 The U.S. Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting arbitration on behalf
of special interest groups.  See the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000)), some-
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another national idiosyncrasy:  the role of the civil jury in deciding contract
claims, often beginning with a bias in favor of the consumer or employee (the
proverbial “little guy”) against the manufacturers or employers.  Concerned
about the lack of rationality in jury verdicts, the business community sees arbi-
tration as a more reasonable alternative to court litigation.
The lack of a general scheme to protect consumers and employees means
that courts often stretch to protect consumers and employees through ordinary
contract principles.  On a case-by-case basis, doctrines such as “unconsciona-
bility,” “excessive cost,” and “mutuality of remedy” have been pressed into
service to safeguard the interests of weaker parties to adhesion contracts.67
Moreover, on some occasions, some misguided and ill-instructed courts have
gone so far as to deny arbitrators any authority to address jurisdictional matters,
even on an interim (non-binding) basis.68
B. Admissibility
Often we understand better what something is by considering what it is
not.  The essence of arbitral jurisdiction might be put into starker relief through
a comparison with what is sometimes called “admissibility.”
A precondition to arbitration (limiting an arbitrator’s right to hear the
case) is not the same thing as a precondition to recovery (restricting one side’s
right to obtain damages).  For example, arbitrators might well have authority to
hear a dispute over mismanagement of a brokerage account but might deny the
claim on the basis that the statute of limitations had passed.69  The claim is
times known as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor, the late Sonny Bono.
Recently, Senator Jeff Sessions (Rep. Alabama) proposed legislation intended to provide
broad protection of consumer interests, albeit perhaps of an over-inclusive nature that sacri-
fices vital elements of party autonomy and efficient dispute resolution. See Fair Arbitration
Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).  The Canadian Supreme Court has recently con-
sidered consumer protection in the context of its decision in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union
des consommateurs, [2007] S.C.R 34 (Can.).
67 See, e.g., Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002), reh’g denied, 57 P.3d
41 (Mont. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).  In refusing to compel arbitration
against a financial adviser accused of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty (the alleged
victim was a ninety-five-year old widow), the Montana Supreme Court held the arbitration
clause to be an impermissible attempt to waive basic rights guaranteed by the Montana
constitution.
68 In MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Credit, 132 P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006), the court vacated an
arbitration award used to collect on a credit card debt of one Ms. Loretta K. Credit.  The
Bank had been unable to produce an arbitration agreement, and reason existed to suspect that
the arbitration service provider might have been showing a systematic sympathy to financial
institutions inconsistent with the impartiality one expects of arbitral institutions.  To reach its
decision, the court need only have noted that the bank had provided no evidence of an
agreement to arbitrate.  Unfortunately, however, the court added dictum stating, “[w]hen the
existence of the [arbitration] agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court
before the arbitrator may proceed.” Id. at 900.  The assertion has no foundation in logic,
policy, or law.
69 Other illustrations of pre-conditions to recover can be found in long-term supply con-
tracts, which often provide for arbitration of disputes about price adjustments.  Frequently,
price modification will require the arbitrators (i) first to find a change in market conditions,
and (ii) then to establish how far (and in what direction) the prices should be modified to
reflect such changed conditions.  Both questions remain matters of the substantive merits of
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properly before the arbitrators, and thus the arbitrators’ decision would usually
not be reviewable in court.70
Admissibility often relates to whether a claim is ripe enough (or too stale)
for adjudication, or to arbitral preconditions (such as mediation) or time bars (a
prohibition on claims more than six years after the alleged wrong).  In particu-
lar, distinctions must often be made between (i) the time bar in a statute of
limitations and (ii) a time restriction on arbitration eligibility.  The difference is
crucial.  The statute of limitations (a matter of admissibility) bars recovery
itself, whether before courts or arbitrators.  The limitation applies to the claim-
ant’s right to receive damages, regardless of the forum.  By contrast, a jurisdic-
tional limit restricts eligibility for arbitration.  The restriction tells us that the
case must be brought in court (rather than before the arbitrator) but says noth-
ing about whether the claim itself is time barred.
C. The Nature of Authority:  Out of Bounds or Just Wrong?
A defect in jurisdiction does not necessarily mean an incorrect decision
about whatever question has been put at issue.71  Rather, jurisdictional chal-
lenges remain neutral of the merits of the case, addressed to the question of
whether arbitrators have gone (or will go) out of bounds.  At stake is not
whether claimant breached the contract or owes $10 million, but rather the
identity of the forum (arbitration or court proceeding) that will address and
adjudicate the questions of contract breach and damages.  Even if the respon-
dent did breach, and does owe the money, an arbitrator lacking jurisdiction
would not be authorized to hear the arguments.
A jurisdictional challenge asserts that the arbitrator has no right at all to
hear a matter or exercise a procedural power.  The challenge may be directed at
the case in its entirety, a particular question (such as a competition counter-
claim), or the exercise of a procedural power (such as imposing sanctions for
failure to produce documents or granting interest).  The problem may also rest
with the absence of a precondition to arbitration, such as the expiry of time
limits.72
The labels applied to excess of authority may vary from country to coun-
try, with related terms (“jurisdiction,” “authority,” “powers,” and “mission”)
often pressed into service almost interchangeably.  In the United States, excess
the case since the parties intended them to be addressed by the arbitrators rather than courts.
The two-fold nature of the arbitrators’ task simply represents the parties’ assessment of the
most efficient and logical way for analysis to proceed. See generally contribution by Jan
Paulsson in INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE & DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  LIBER AMICORUM
IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 601 (2005).
70 There might, however, be some situations in which valid jurisdictional challenges could
be mounted to improper decisions on admissibility.  If a contract says no actions may be
filed before 2010, a putative award in 2005 would appear to most observers as an exce`s de
pouvoir (subject to annulment) rather than simply an unreviewable mistake about calendars.
71 See discussion of the illustration infra note 77.
72 A precondition to recovery, of course, is not the same thing as a precondition to arbitra-
tion.  For example, arbitrators might well have the right to hear a case, but deny the claim on
the basis that the statute of limitations had passed.  The distinction is sometimes referred to
as between jurisdiction and “admissibility.”
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of authority sometimes overlaps with notions related to legal error when courts
set aside awards for “manifest disregard of the law.”73
Attempts to grapple with the nature of arbitral jurisdiction raise a difficult
intellectual challenge.  Analysis sometimes conflates substantive errors on the
merits (misinterpretation of the law) with errors of jurisdiction for the purpose
of subjecting arbitral decisions to judicial review.  After all, it might be argued,
the parties never authorized the arbitrators to make a mistake.  Thus from one
perspective, each time the arbitrators go wrong in law they go beyond their
mandate.74  According to this view, since mistakes are not authorized, by defi-
nition they constitute an excess of authority.
Admittedly, it is not easy to articulate an intellectually rigorous test for
distinguishing jurisdictional error from other types of mistakes, either for com-
mercial arbitration or for law in general.75  As with most legal problems, the
difficulties lie at the fringes.76  However, definitional difficulty does not mean
that vital distinctions cease to exist between a decision that is wrong and one
that exceeds the authority of the purported decision-maker.77
In deciding challenges to arbitral authority, the parties’ intent should serve
as the touchstone and the lodestar.  If the arbitrators have addressed (or are
likely to address) questions that the parties submitted to arbitration, they do not
exceed their power.
This distinction between a mistake on the merits and an excess of author-
ity goes to the heart of what arbitration is all about.  Arbitration is a consensual
process unfolding within an enclosure created by contract.  Litigants accept the
risk of arbitrator mistake only for decisions falling within the borders of arbitral
authority.  A simple error is normally not subject to challenge since the parties
73 See, e.g., Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2001); Hans Smit, Manifest
Disregard of the Law in New York Court of Appeals, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 315 (2004);
see also Stephan Wilske & Nigel Mackay, The Myth of the ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law’
Doctrine:  Is This Challenge to the Finality of Arbitral Awards Confined to U.S. Domestic
Arbitrations or Should International Arbitration Practitioners be Concerned?, 24 ASA
BULL. 216 (2006).
74 Such was the position once taken in England by Lord Denning, who suggested (albeit in
an administrative context) that “whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the
jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.” LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF
LAW 74 (1979).  Happily for the health of English law, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected
this position in the Lesotho Highlands decision.
75 For an inquiry into similar questions in public international law, see W. MICHAEL REIS-
MAN, NULLITY AND REVISION (1971).
76 In some instances, the very same facts might be relevant both to the merits of a dispute
and to jurisdiction. See Jackson v. Fie Corp., 302 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2002).
77 The world of education provides a relatively simple illustration of the difference between
simple mistake and excess of authority.  In American law faculties, the professor who
teaches a course normally bears responsibility for grading exams.  If the lecturer decides that
a paper merits a “B,” then the student receives a “B,” perhaps adjusted for classroom partici-
pation, again by the professor.  Now assume that a colleague happens by chance to read the
exam, and finds the grade excessively severe (the student deserved an “A”) or unduly gener-
ous (the paper merits only a “C”).  The second professor’s views do not matter, whether
correct or not.  Each professor bears the authority and duty to grade his or her exams.  That
being said, not all authors would agree that a distinction can be made between the merits of a
dispute and jurisdiction, at least in the context of court actions.
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asked an arbitrator to decide the legal and factual merits of their dispute.  But
no court should recognize an award falling beyond the arbitral authority that
gives legitimacy and integrity to the process.
A party disappointed by an award will sometimes attempt a “backdoor”
appeal through arguments that depict the arbitrator’s mistake as an excess of
authority rather than a contract misinterpretation.  Errors of law in contract
interpretation seem to lend themselves to being portrayed as excess of jurisdic-
tion.  An award allowing lost profits, for example, might be portrayed as an
arrogation of power not granted by the contract.
The distinction between simple mistake and excess of authority derives
from a tension between two principles.  The first confirms that agreements to
arbitrate mean acceptance that the arbitrator might get it wrong.  Arbitration
would become mere foreplay to court litigation if litigants automatically got a
second bite at the apple.  Equally important, however, is the principle that liti-
gants in arbitral proceedings do not expect to be bound by overreaching inter-
meddlers.  Decisions on matters never submitted to arbitration deserve no more
deference than the opinions of a random commuter passing through the Paris
Me´tro or New York’s Grand Central Station.
While such extreme examples may be rare (due to the in terrorem effect
of judicial scrutiny), they do exist.  Until enjoined by a federal court, a Florida
“arbitration service” recently conducted 114 “arbitrations” against a bank.78  In
each instance, a credit card holder received an “award” in the precise amount of
the cardholder’s outstanding debt, even though the bank had never signed an
agreement authorizing the arbitration service to decide these disputes.
In the more normal line of cases, sound analysis requires different thresh-
olds for various types of consent.  An agreement to arbitrate must be explicit
and normally must be evidenced in writing.  However, once that “writing”
exists, the scope of the arbitrator’s procedural authority might be inferred or
presumed from practice in related disputes or trade usage.  Consent implicates a
continuum of commitment.  Once the major step (an agreement to arbitrate) has
been taken, the details (for example, arbitrator power on matters such as inter-
est) might yield more easily to presumptions.79
This should not be surprising, given the varying manifestations of consent
in aspects of life other than arbitration.  Only the most unromantic (or unrealis-
tic) individual would argue that a woman’s consent to receive tenderness from
her boyfriend must be in writing.  A glance or a phrase can supply the invita-
tion (and consent) to hold her hand.  By contrast, her consent to be married
normally requires a higher degree of formality, evidenced by ceremony and
explicit words of acceptance.
78 Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. v. Nat’l Arbitration Council, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1205-
J-32HTS, 2005 WL 1270504 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2005).  One Mr. Charles Morgan acted as
sole arbitrator under the auspices of the National Arbitration Council (“NAC”), of which he
was sole proprietor.  The arbitration clause in the credit agreement listed three arbitral insti-
tutions:  American Arbitration Association, JAMS, and National Arbitration Forum.  The
court granted an injunction against NAC and Mr. Morgan from conducting arbitrations or
issuing awards involving the bank (Chase) and from accepting any monies from Chase card-
holders for arbitration services. Id. at *4.
79 For an exploration of consent as a series of concentric circles, see Alan Scott Rau, Fed-
eral Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169 (2007).
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III. THE “ARBITRABILITY QUESTION”
A. Legal Framework
With respect to the timing of judicial intervention on jurisdictional mat-
ters, the Federal Arbitration Act creates no statutory presumption that courts
should await the award before pronouncing themselves on an arbitrator’s
authority to hear a dispute.  At any stage in the arbitral process, courts can
decide whether a particular matter has been (or can be) submitted to arbitration,
usually in the context of a motion to compel arbitration or to stay litigation.80
Courts remain free to order jurisdictional questions to be resolved by a jury.81
In this respect, American law differs from that of many other countries, which
provide full jurisdictional review by courts only after an award has been
rendered.
On the matter of the finality, American law also possesses a special char-
acter, although operating in a way often more generous to arbitrators than in
other nations.  In some instances, arbitrators get both the first and the last word
in determining their own authority.  The conceptual underpinning of this
approach relies on a finding that “the parties intended that the question of arbi-
trability [used in the sense of jurisdiction] shall be decided by the arbitrator.”82
With a different vocabulary, American courts have in essence adopted the
old German concept of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause, by which the parties
may agree to submit a jurisdictional matter to final and binding arbitration.83
In essence, the litigants’ consent permits a jurisdictional matter to fall within
the realm of substantive issues to be resolved by arbitrators.  The court review-
ing the matter must ask simply what (if anything) was (or is) intended.
This exercise remains regardless of whether allegations are made that the
contract (or the arbitration agreement) was “void” as opposed to “voidable.”84
80 See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (FAA section 3 provides that federal courts shall stay competing
litigation “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such [judicial] suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration.”).
81 See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274 (3d Cir.
2003); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
82 See PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1199 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Alliance
Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., Inc. v. Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006).  The
principle has also been extended to class actions in Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, 167
F. App’x 266 (2d Cir. 2006).  A motion to vacate the arbitrators’ construction of the contract
language was denied in Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, No. 04 Civ. 6069 (RMB), 2007
WL 3019234 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007).
83 American courts are often unwilling to use the same vocabulary as other nations, prefer-
ring to talk of “the arbitrability question” rather than jurisdiction. See First Options of Chi.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 596-98
(1st Cir. 1996).
84 In the past, judicial decisions often distinguished between “void” and “voidable” clauses.
A void clause could never serve as authority for any putative arbitrator, while a voidable
clause might.  The instinct is understandable. Ex nihilo nihil fit:  nothing comes from noth-
ing.  However, the void/voidable distinction seems unnecessary if courts ask simply whether
an intent to arbitrate exists, and was mercifully laid to rest by the United States Supreme
Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2006). See gen-
erally, Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitra-
tion, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 34-36 (2002).  For cases involving allegedly void clauses,
see Sandvik, 220 F.3d 99; Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. All American Insurance Co., 256
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Courts now ask (or should ask) simply, “Is there consent to arbitrate?”  If the
litigants did not intend to arbitrate, it might be because the alleged consent was
void or non-existent from the beginning, due to lack of capacity or forgery.  Or
consent might have once existed, but now be lacking because one side was
induced to arbitrate by fraud aimed directly at the arbitral process (not the main
agreement), making the arbitration clause subject to rescission.85
B. The Dictum in First Options
To understand the “arbitrability question” approach, the most convenient
starting point might be First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan.86  In dictum, this
U.S. Supreme Court decision supplied a verbal hook on which much subse-
quent case analysis has been hung.  Almost invariably, these cases cite First
Options for the dual proposition that (i) contracting parties may agree to arbi-
trate jurisdictional matters (questions about “arbitrability”) but (ii) such agree-
ment must be founded on clear evidence.
Prior to that decision, general American contract principles certainly
existed to provide a doctrinal foundation for deference to arbitrators’ decisions
on their authority. First Options, however, supplied a high level of visibility
and authoritative endorsement for such deference.87
In First Options, an arbitral award had been rendered against both an
investment company and its owners with respect to debts owed to a securities
clearing house.  The owners (husband and wife) argued that they had never
signed the arbitration agreement and consequently were not bound by the
award.  The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between three questions:
(i) Did the Kaplans owe money (the substantive merits)?  (ii) Did the Kaplans
agree to arbitrate (jurisdiction, which the court called “arbitrability”)? and
(iii) Who (court or arbitrator) should decide whether the Kaplans agreed to
arbitrate (which the Court called the “standard of review” question)?88
On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
finding that the owners had not agreed to arbitrate, without any judicial defer-
ence to the arbitrator’s determination.89  Whether Manuel and Carol Kaplan
F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001); Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925
F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991); and Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.
of America, 242 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  With respect to voidable clauses, see
Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
85 For a case involving fraud related to the arbitral process, see Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), involving a malpractice claim against a health
care provider in which habitual delays in arbitration were found to constitute fraud by the
provider.
86 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. See generally, William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta
in First Options v. Kaplan:  What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?,
12 ARB. INT’L 137 (1996), reprinted in 11 INT’L ARB. REP. 28 (1996).
87 See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); discussion
infra note 92.  See also Rau, supra note 38, at 294, suggesting that the dictum of First
Options can be “found fully developed in earlier Supreme Court opinions.”  Not all observ-
ers have noticed such full development.
88 First Options, 514 U.S. at 942.
89 The Supreme Court also dealt with the standard a court of appeals should apply when
reviewing a district court decision relating to vacatur or confirmation of an arbitral award
under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Court held that a district court’s find-
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were bound to arbitrate by virtue of a clause signed by their investment com-
pany was a question for courts.  It was for a judge, not arbitrator, to provide the
ultimate determination on whether Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan were in fact bound to
arbitrate by reason of the actions of their investment company, on theories such
as agency, alter ego, or lifting the corporate veil.
Although unnecessary to the holding of the case, the Supreme Court went
further and suggested that in some situations (although not under the facts of
First Options) “the arbitrability question itself” might be submitted to arbitra-
tion.90  In such a situation, the courts must defer (“give considerable leeway”)
to arbitrators’ decisions on the limits of their own jurisdiction.  However, the
burden of showing that a non-signatory intended to arbitrate remained with the
party seeking arbitration.91  The dictum’s critical language (which in some situ-
ations may eclipse the holding of the case) reads as follows:
If [the parties agreed to submit arbitrability to arbitration] then the court’s standard
for reviewing the arbitrator’s decision about that matter should not differ from the
standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed to
arbitrate.  That is to say, the court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator,
setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances.92
Given the longevity of Supreme Court dictum in the field of arbitration,93
its teaching on “the arbitrability question” can be expected to weigh heavily on
the future allocation of functions between courts and arbitrators.  At the least,
the dictum now requires judges to ask not only whether arbitrators exceeded
their powers, but also whether the arbitrators were given authority to decide a
jurisdictional matter in a way deserving deference.94
One difficulty with the dictum is that the term “arbitrability” can cover so
many different matters:  whether a person ever agreed to arbitrate at all; the
ings of fact should be accepted unless “clearly erroneous,” but that questions of law should
be decided de novo.  The Third Circuit agreed with the owners that they were not bound by
the arbitration agreement and therefore had reversed the district court confirmation of the
award against them.
90 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
91 In the United States, given the absence of any federal common law, the bindingness of an
arbitration clause would be a matter for state law principles.
92 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (internal citations omitted).  For the proposition that arbi-
trability can be submitted to arbitrators, the Court cited to alleged authority in labor arbitra-
tion: AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649, and United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960).  Invocation of these labor cases must
be approached with caution.  In the United States, the statutory basis for labor arbitration lies
in section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (commonly called the “Taft-
Hartley Act”), rather than the Federal Arbitration Act. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).  Admittedly, the law under the FAA and the
LMRA has seen a convergence, with courts routinely citing cases decided under one statute
in connection with another.  Neither of the two cited cases actually found an agreement to
arbitrate the question of arbitrability.  In AT&T Technologies, the Court held that the lower
court’s decision to allow the arbitrator to decide arbitrability was error.  475 U.S. at 651-52.
Warrior & Gulf said that “[i]t is clear . . . in this case [that] . . . the question of arbitrability is
for the courts to decide.”  363 U.S. at 583 n.7 (internal citation omitted).
93 See, e.g., the Court’s obscure pronouncement on arbitrator “manifest disregard” of the
law in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which has continued to be invoked long after the
holding in the case was overruled.
94 See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
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scope of an admittedly valid arbitration clause; and public policy limits on what
arbitrators can and cannot decide.  Only the second of those issues (scope of the
parties’ agreement) would normally be capable of delegation to arbitrators in a
single agreement.  The third category (public policy) would never be capable of
delegation.
C. Strangers to the Arbitration
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the dictum arises in connection
when a respondent in an arbitration asserts that it never agreed to arbitrate or a
respondent in a judicial action claims the benefit of an arbitration clause.  Dele-
gation of jurisdictional authority on that question would normally require a sep-
arate agreement.  A contract clause purporting to give arbitrators power to
determine their own authority does not, in itself, insulate from judicial review a
decision to add a party that never agreed to arbitrate.  The mere narration or
recital of the arbitrator’s power on a printed form cannot be confused with a
genuine grant of authority.
The suggestion that arbitrators can determine their own jurisdiction with
respect to the identity of the parties, without a separate agreement submitting
that question to arbitration, brings to mind the picture of Baron Mu¨nchhausen
pulling himself up by his own pigtail.  In many cases such a principle will
assume the very proposition (arbitral jurisdiction) that remains to be proven.  In
the absence of an arbitration agreement accepted by the person alleged to be
bound with respect to the dispute in question, the person rendering the award
would seem better characterized as a vigilante, intermeddler, or imposter.
This does not mean that a contract may never be interpreted as giving the
arbitrator power to determine whether a particular person agreed to arbitrate at
all.  Rather, such agreements must be truly distinct from, and chronologically
subsequent to, the alleged principal agreement.  For example, a buyer might
sign a purchase contract with a seller corporation.  When a dispute arises, the
seller might allege that an arbitration clause in the contract bound not only the
seller corporation, but also its parent entity.  Or, the seller’s parent might claim
the benefit of the arbitration clause in attempting to avoid a court action
brought against the parent by the seller.  The theory might be advanced that the
subsidiary had contracted as agent for the parent, or that the parent was the alter
ego of the subsidiary.
After a dispute arises, nothing would prevent the parent from agreeing to
ask an arbitrator to determine whether it was in fact bound by the arbitration
clause.  The arbitral tribunal to whose authority the parent has consented under
the second agreement would be convened to determine whether the parent
bound itself under the first agreement.  In such a case, an arbitral tribunal so
constituted would do no more than decide the merits of a question of fact and/
or law about whether the initial agreement empowered the arbitrator to the
extent asserted.95
95 This is exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry
of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 W.L.R. 1096, 1 All E.
R. 823 (Eng.).  Buyers of wheat at first refused to arbitrate a dispute with the shipper over
demurrage, on the theory that the arbitration clause in the charter party had not been incorpo-
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Courts must be vigilant not to accept contract recitals of arbitral authority
without looking at what the parties actually agreed.  For example, in Apollo
Computer v. Berg96 a contract between a Massachusetts computer company
and a Swedish distributor was terminated, and the rights of the bankrupt Swed-
ish distributor were assigned to a third party.  The Massachusetts company
claimed that the contract’s non-assignment provision covered the arbitration
clause, which became void as a consequence of the assignment.
The court held that the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the claims was a ques-
tion for the arbitrators themselves to decide.  An arbitral tribunal was appointed
pursuant to the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”),
which call for jurisdictional objections to be referred to the arbitrators as long
as the ICC is prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists.97
On this basis, the American court reasoned that the parties had agreed to
submit the arbitrability question to the arbitrators.  On closer examination, the
decision might reveal itself as an exercise in circular reasoning, presuming its
own conclusion.  The problem is not that the parties lacked the power to submit
the jurisdictional question to arbitration, but whether they actually did so.  If
the arbitration agreement was in fact automatically terminated by the assign-
ment, then the ICC Arbitration Rules become relevant.98
IV. AMPLIFYING FIRST OPTIONS IN SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide a perspec-
tive on how American jurisdictional methodology plays itself out in practice.
The following two cases, Howsam and Bazzle, address which threshold precon-
ditions for arbitration are to be determined by judges and which are for
arbitrators.99
rated in the bill of lading, which by the charter party’s terms was to “supersede” the charter
party.  The parties submitted to ad hoc arbitration the question of whether the arbitration
clause had been incorporated into the bill of lading.
96 Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989).  See also the sequel to
Apollo in Hewlett Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995), vacating a confirmation
order and remanding for further proceedings the award, confirmed in 867 F. Supp. 1126 (D.
Mass. 1994).  Similar questions were discussed in Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v.
Raytheon European Management and Systems Co., 643 F.2d 863 (1st Cir. 1981).
97 ICC Rules, supra note 8, at art. 6(2).  At the time, the applicable rule was found in Article
8 and referred to the “prima facie” existence of the arbitration agreement, rather than the
ICC Court being prima facie satisfied.
98 A better approach might have been simply to make a finding about the effect of the
assignment under Massachusetts law, which seemed to provide that a general non-assign-
ment clause bars the delegation of duties, but not the assignment of rights, including the right
to arbitrate.  For better or for worse, the court of appeals refused to address the issue, instead
resting its decision on the principle that the effect of the assignment was a question for the
arbitrators.  Such was the approach of the federal district court. See Apollo Computer, 886
F.2d at 472.
99 See generally William W. Park, The Contours of Arbitral Jurisdiction:  Who Decides
What?, 3 INT’L ARB. NEWS 2 (2003), reprinted in 18 INT’L ARB. REP. 21 (2003).  A third
Supreme Court opinion, PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003), is
often discussed in connection with Howsam and Bazzle.  In a puzzling footnote, the Court
stated that the question at issue was “not a question of arbitrability.” Id. at 407 n.2.  In light
of its somewhat different rationale, courts wait to see how the arbitrators will decide. Pacifi-
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A. Time Limits
Securities arbitration has been a particularly fruitful ground for jurisdic-
tional conflict with respect to time limits.  The investor generally tells of a
“nest egg” lost due to a financial adviser’s misconduct, with golden retirement
years turned into a financially harsh old age due to unsuitable investments.  The
adviser, of course, replies that the customer was well aware of the risks and
pushed hard for aggressive growth stocks.
The reason time bars are so frequently invoked in brokerage disputes is
that the investor is a bit like a casino gambler:  happy when winning, but likely
to complain in the event of a loss.100  If stock rises in value, there would be no
loss and thus no grumbling that the investment advice was “unsuitable.”  Only
when things later go sour will the broker be accused of misbehavior, even
though the purchase of securities might be many years in the past.101
In Howsam v. Dean Witter,102 the drama played itself out through an
investment in limited partnerships in which the performance proved unsatisfac-
tory, causing the investor to allege broker misrepresentation of the investment’s
quality.  The brokerage firm then filed suit in federal court requesting an
injunction against the arbitration on the ground that the original investment
advice was more than six years old and thus barred by the NASD “eligibility
rule” requiring that any claim be brought within six years of the relevant occur-
rence.103  The Supreme Court gave the arbitrators a green light to determine
whether their power to hear the case was affected by time limits contained in
the arbitration rules.
Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or arbitrator) decides
on “eligibility” requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court in Howsam held that
time limits were for the arbitrator.  An opinion by Justice Breyer paid lip ser-
vice to the principle that judges would normally decide gateway jurisdictional
matters unless the parties clearly provided otherwise.  However, the Court pre-
sumed (rightly or wrongly) the parties’ intent that the NASD Rules be con-
strued by the arbitrators themselves, who were supposed to possess (according
to the Court) special familiarity and expertise in interpreting these rules.104
Care has been discussed earlier, along with Lesotho Highlands, in relation to the impact of
contract interpretation on arbitral jurisdiction.
100 While the investment in Howsam had occurred sometime between the account opening
in 1986 and its closing in 1994, the arbitration was begun only in 1997.
101 One recalls the vignette from the 1942 movie Casablanca, starring Humphrey Bogart
and Ingrid Bergman.  The French police captain, played by Claude Rains, closed down
Rick’s Cafe´ because he was “shocked” to find gambling going on—all the while being quite
happy to take his winnings.
102 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).  The unanimous decision
was written by Justice Breyer.  A concurrence by Justice Thomas rested solely on the basis
that New York law (applicable to the contract in question) had held that time bars under the
NASD Rules are for arbitrators to decide.
103 NASD Code of Arbitration section 10304 (formerly rule 15), states that no dispute “shall
be eligible for submission to arbitration . . . where six (6) years have elapsed from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the . . . dispute.” Id. at 81.
104 The court also noted that section 10324 of the NASD Rules (formerly Rule 35) gave
arbitrators power to “interpret and determine the applicability of all [NASD code provi-
sions.]” Id. at 86.  For another case on time limits, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
Exalon Industries, Inc., 138 F.3d 426 (1st Cir. 1998) (time limits for challenging award do
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B. Class Actions
A plurality of the Court followed a similar line of reasoning in Green Tree
Financial Corp v. Bazzle,105 which involved an attempt at class action arbitra-
tion of disputes arising from consumer loans used to purchase mobile homes
and finance residential improvements.  Once again, the Supreme Court punted
the question to the arbitrator.
In violation of South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code, the lender
allegedly neglected to give borrowers notice about the right to name their own
lawyers and insurance agents.  Two groups of borrowers filed separate suits in
the South Carolina state courts seeking class certification of their claims against
the lender.  Ultimately, the two actions were consolidated and proceeded to
arbitration before the same arbitrator.106
After the arbitrator awarded each class several million dollars plus attor-
neys’ fees, the South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated the lender’s appeals
and ruled that the relevant loan contracts permitted class actions in arbitra-
tion.107  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
state court holding was consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.  The plural-
ity opinion by Justice Breyer announced that the permissibility of class action
arbitration was a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the
courts.  For Justice Breyer and his plurality, the question was “what kind of
arbitration proceeding [had] the parties agreed to?”  If the contract is silent, the
question was for the arbitrator, they said.108  The state court decision was
vacated and remanded for further consideration.109
not apply when existence of an arbitration agreement is challenged). Contra MBNA Am.
Bank, N.A. v. Hart, 710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 2006); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Swartz, No.
Civ.A. 1192-N, 2006 WL 1071523 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2006) (time bar for challenging
clause).
105 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  The interesting plurality decision
split 4-1-3-1.  Four Justices concluded that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether the
contracts allowed class action arbitration.  One concurred in the judgment although he would
have preferred to affirm the South Carolina decision that ordered arbitration to proceed as a
class action.  Three Justices dissented on the basis that any imposition of class-wide arbitra-
tion contravened the parties’ contract, and one dissented on the ground that the FAA should
not apply in state courts.
106 Id. at 449.
107 The South Carolina Supreme Court had determined that the loan contracts were silent
with respect to class action.  By contrast, at the U.S. Supreme Court, the dissenting opinion
by Justice Rehnquist found that that the contracts forbid class arbitration, while the opinion
by Justice Breyer delivered for the Court essentially ducked the issue and held that it was for
the arbitrator to determine whether the contract allowed class arbitration.
108 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53 (emphasis omitted).  With respect to the implications of
silence, one is reminded of the playful comparisons of European legal systems.  In Germany,
all which is not permitted is forbidden.  In France, all which is not forbidden is permitted.
To which some add that in Italy all which is forbidden is also permitted.
109 A dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy) argued
that any imposition of class-wide arbitration contravened the parties’ contract as a matter of
law.  Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Federal Arbitration Act should not
apply in state courts.  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but dissented from its rea-
soning.  Believing that the state court was correct as a matter of law that class action arbitra-
tion was permitted, Stevens would have affirmed the South Carolina decision.  However, to
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It is, of course, possible that litigants might agree to give an arbitrator
broad power to determine whether an arbitration clause includes the possibility
of class action.  However, such a conclusion is by no means obvious from the
language of the relevant contracts, each of which was accepted by an individual
borrower and provided for an arbitrator to be selected for all disputes arising
from reference to the singular (not plural) expression:  “this contract.”110  In
commercial arbitration, the normal presumption has always been that parties
agree to arbitrate with particular claimants or respondents, not with the whole
world.  Moreover, prior to Bazzle, the FAA did not authorize forced joinder of
different arbitrations arising out of related claims.111
In one post-Bazzle case (on appeal as of this writing), a federal district
court vacated an arbitral award that had interpreted a maritime transport con-
tract to include a class action stipulation.112  In finding “manifest disregard” of
the law, the court stressed both the maritime nature of the contracts (as to
which expert testimony established a clear presumption against class actions)
and the principle of New York law that when contracts are silent on an issue no
agreement has been reached.113
A new twist was added by a court of appeals decision arising from cus-
tomer disputes with a cable television provider. Kristian v. Comcast Corp.114
avoid the absence of any controlling majority (only three out of nine Justices agreed with
Rehnquist), Stevens concurred with Breyer in the judgment.
110 In passing, one might ask to what extent the result in Bazzle was influenced by the
somewhat unusual language in the arbitration clause, which specified arbitration to resolve
not only contract-related disputes claims or controversies, but also controversies arising from
or relating to “the relationships that result from this contract.”
111 Prior to Bazzle, the FAA did not authorize forced joinder of different arbitrations arising
out of related claims except as agreed by the parties or when conducted pursuant to a statute
that explicitly so provides. See United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993)
(denying consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc. relating to contract with
the British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system).  That result might in
some instances be modified by state statute.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 251, § 2A
(2007), which calls for consolidation as provided in the MASS. R. CIV. P. 42, which permits
joinder of actions “involving a common question of law or fact.” New England Energy Inc.
v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), has held that a federal court sitting in
Massachusetts may order consolidation of related arbitrations pursuant to state statute. Cf.
CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 1281.3 (West 2007).
112 Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
113 Id. at 387.  As to the parties’ intent, the court might well have reached the right result.
Given the long tradition of non-consolidation for international maritime arbitration, some-
thing quite special would be needed to justify a determination that the litigants granted the
arbitrators authority to create a class action process  However, it is by no means certain that
the arbitrators’ mistake (if it was one) could be characterized as “manifest disregard” of law.
The job of interpreting the parties’ intent falls to the arbitrators.  This task, which implicates
mixed questions of fact and law, as well as evaluation of industry custom and practice, has
always been entrusted to the arbitrators.
114 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).  See also Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), declaring a class action waiver to be uncon-
scionable, and Strand v. U.S. Bank National Association, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005),
upholding such waivers.
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held that a ban on class actions would invalidate the arbitration agreement,115
but for the possibility of severing the class action prohibition.  In an action for
antitrust violations under both state and federal law, the court applied a con-
sumer protection rationale to conclude that the validity of the ban on arbi-
trability of the class action should be decided by courts rather than arbitrators.
The court allowed the arbitration to proceed only after striking down and sever-
ing this prohibition.
C. Arbitral Jurisdiction and Contract Interpretation
In a commercial agreement, broadly drafted arbitration clauses often give
the arbitrator authority to construe contract language.  In some instances, the
relevant language may affect the arbitrator’s procedural powers on matters such
as attorneys’ fees116 and punitive damages,117 or the right to make an award in
foreign currency.118
Consequently, arbitral authority may depend on how arbitrators interpret
specific provisions in the parties’ agreement, causing a tension that arises
between two fundamental and equally important principles.  On the one hand,
arbitrators (not judges) interpret the contract.  On the other hand, arbitrators
have no power to “bootstrap” themselves into a job by creating powers that
never existed.  As in so many other matters, proper resolution of this conflict
will depend on the particular facts of each case.
The struggle between these principles can be illustrated by PacifiCare
Health Systems v. Book,119 where a group of doctors had filed a nationwide
class action against several health maintenance organizations, alleging that the
organizations had conspired to refuse proper reimbursement for services pro-
vided under the health plans accepted by the physicians.  The action included
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations  Act
(“RICO”),120 which allows awards of damages three times greater than any
actual damage proven.
There was a catch, however.  The physicians had agreed to resolve dis-
putes with the health care providers through arbitration.  And some of the arbi-
115 The arbitration clause itself provided (in bold face capitals!) that “there shall be no right
or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis.” Kristian,
446 F.3d at 31.
116 See Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 118 F. App’x 546 (2d Cir. 2004);
Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003); PaineWebber Inc. v.
Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).  Compare CIT Project Finance, L.L.C. v. Credit Suisse
First Boston LLC, No. 600847/03, 2004 WL 2941331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 17, 2004), a
distinguishable case in which the contract gave the arbitrator power to decide only a narrow
question whose resolution did not dispose of the claim.
117 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
118 See the decision of the English House of Lords with respect to awards in non-Sterling
currency: Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio SpA [2005] 3 W.L.R. 129, 3 All E.R.
789 (Eng.).  The 1996 Arbitration Act permitted arbitrators to make foreign currency awards,
but only “unless otherwise agreed” by the parties. See generally William W. Park, The
Nature of Arbitral Authority:  A Comment on Lesotho Highlands, 21 ARB. INT’L 483 (2005).
119 PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003), reversing In re Humana Inc.
Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002).
120 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).  Section 1964 provides that persons injured by viola-
tions of RICO shall recover “threefold the damages he sustains” as well as attorney’s fees.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ107.txt unknown Seq: 31 16-JAN-08 14:21
Fall 2007] DETERMINING AN ARBITRATOR’S JURISDICTION 165
tration agreements to which they had agreed were explicit in prohibiting
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.121
The Supreme Court allowed the arbitrators themselves to determine, as an
initial matter, whether they could grant treble recovery under the RICO, not-
withstanding the contract limitation on punitive damages.  While the case is
sometimes presented as an example of judges deferring to arbitrators on juris-
dictional matters, the Court in fact followed a different (and rather murky) line
by denying that it was engaged in jurisdictional analysis at all.
In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, a unanimous Supreme Court
upheld the health care organizations’ right to compel arbitration.  Justice Scalia
asserted that it was not clear (at least to him) that the power to award punitive
damages presented a gateway “arbitrability question,” which is to say, a juris-
dictional issue.
The key to the Court’s reasoning lies in its assumption about the ambigu-
ity of the term “punitive damages” and the nature of treble damages in the
RICO statute.  The Court suggested that some judicial decisions had given
treble damages a compensatory character, “serving remedial purposes in addi-
tion to punitive objectives.”122  Consequently, the Court expressed agnosticism
about whether an arbitrator would or would not interpret the punitive damage
prohibitions in a way that might cast doubt on the permissibility of treble
damages.123
In essence, the Court decided not to decide but to pursue a “wait and see”
policy.  On the theoretical level, therefore, the case cannot be said to give the
arbitrators’ power to make final a determination on the matter of their author-
ity.  Justice Scalia might have been saying no more than that the matter is not
ripe for determination until the court knows whether the arbitrators will in fact
exceed their jurisdiction or violate public policy.124
Justice Scalia, however, added to the suspense with an intriguing footnote.
“If the conceptual ambiguity [about what the prohibition on punitive damages
might mean] could itself be characterized as raising a ‘gateway’ question of
arbitrability,” he reasoned, then “it would be appropriate for a court to answer it
[the arbitrability question] in the first instance.”125  The Court then concluded,
121 The various agreements provided either that (i) “punitive damages shall not be awarded
[in the arbitrations],” (ii) “arbitrators . . . shall have no authority to award any punitive or
exemplary damages” or (iii) “arbitrators . . . shall have no authority to award extra contrac-
tual damages of any kind, including punitive or exemplary damages.” PacifiCare, 538 U.S.
at 405.
122 Id. at 406.  Referring to statutory remedies such as those at issue in RICO claims, Justice
Scalia described treble damages as lying “on different points along the spectrum between
purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.” Id. at 405.
123
“[W]e do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations,” wrote
Justice Scalia, and thus it would be “mere speculation” (using the vocabulary of an earlier
decision in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995)) to pre-
sume that arbitrators might deny themselves the power to grant punitive damages.  The
Court would not take upon itself the authority to decide “the antecedent question” of how the
ambiguity concerning punitive damages is to be resolved. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 405-07.
124 Of course, when an arbitration award can be enforced against assets abroad, this may be
of little consequence.
125 PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407 n.2.  But the footnote continues that the phrase “question of
arbitrability” should be applicable only in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting
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“Given our presumption in favor of arbitration, we think the preliminary ques-
tion whether the remedial limitations at issue here prohibit an award of RICO
treble damages is not a question of arbitrability.”126
What the Court seems to be saying is that arbitrators would construe a
particular expression in the contract (“punitive damages”) in the same way they
interpret any other contract phrase, taking into account the context of the par-
ties’ relationship and other terms in the agreement.  While the meaning given to
these terms might affect one side’s recovery, it would not enlarge arbitral
authority, given that it is already broadly defined under the common arbitration
clause, which gives arbitrators the job of interpreting the language in the par-
ties’ agreement and the applicable law, even (and especially) in close cases.
The troubling aspect of this decision lies in its susceptibility to giving
arbitrators de facto power to determine their own jurisdiction to award treble
damages simply by interpreting the notion of punitive damages.  If the arbitra-
tors held that treble damages under RICO were not “punitive” in the context of
the physicians’ claims, then by definition these damages would be within their
jurisdiction.  Such a result may not be implausible under the circumstances.
Arguments have been made that treble damages make “rough justice” compen-
sation for the disruption that may result from contract breach but be difficult to
quantify.  The slope, however, does not continue indefinitely. At some point
language imposes definite boundaries.
D. The Next Step
As with many legal problems, the heart of jurisdictional dilemmas in arbi-
tration lies in the fact that language, while often ambiguous, is not infinitely
plastic.  Some questions fall within the spectrum of matters the parties intended
the arbitrator to decide.  Others do not.
To illustrate, the Second Circuit has held that an International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC”) arbitrator may address claims for costs incurred in a court
action allegedly brought in breach of an arbitration clause.127  This is hardly
remarkable.  In reaching the conclusion that the parties bargained to arbitrate
“questions of arbitrability,” the court simply noted that the parties had signed a
broad arbitration clause, which would be given effect under the ICC Rules.128
Let us change the facts a bit, however, and imagine a contract that pro-
vides for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”).  If the claimant files its request for arbitration with the ICC, per-
ceived as more likely to appoint an arbitrator predisposed to claimant’s case, it
parties “would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they
are not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and,
consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing
parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.”  There are those
who might observe, however, that the heart of arbitral jurisdiction turns on what the parties
were “likely to have thought” about the decisions an arbitrator was supposed to make.
126 Id. (internal citation omitted).
127 Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 118 F. App’x 546 (2d Cir. 2004); Shaw
Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003).  The arbitration clause at
issue covered disputes “concerning or arising out of [the parties’] Agreement.”
128 Shaw Group, 322 F.3d. at 125.
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is difficult to see how an individual appointed by the ICC (an unlikely event
given the well-known vigilance of ICC staff) could render a final and binding
award, absent modification of the parties’ agreement.
Much of the work in allocating tasks between courts and arbitrators will
turn on characterization of the analytic task.  One formulation might ask, “May
persons who call themselves arbitrators determine their jurisdiction free from
judicial review?”  An affirmative answer would be conceptually problematic,
implying that a piece of paper labeled “award” could be enforced without
regard to the legitimate mission of the alleged arbitrator.
An alternate phraseology could pose the jurisdictional question differently:
“By agreeing to arbitrate, did the parties intend to waive their right to have
courts determine a particular jurisdictional precondition to arbitration (such as
time bars) or a particular substantive question (such as liability for costs of
litigation begun in breach of the arbitration agreement)?”  Answering the latter
question would require a factual inquiry into the parties’ true intent.  In some
instances the consent may reveal itself only through an explicit agreement.  In
other circumstances, presumptions and inferences might suffice.  On this mat-
ter, considerable analytical toil remains.
CONCLUSION:  COSTS AND BENEFITS
The arbitrator’s right to rule on jurisdictional matters implicates both the
timing of court intervention to examine arbitral authority and the finality of
arbitrators’ decisions on their own authority.  The former looks to when judges
should examine arbitral authority, while the other addresses the extent (if any)
of court deference to arbitrators’ jurisdictional decisions.
With respect to the timing of judicial intervention on matters of arbitral
jurisdiction, the United States may well have something to learn from the
French.  By leaving most judicial intervention until after the award, when the
arbitrator’s decision is known, the Gallic approach limits opportunities for dila-
tory measures that might derail or sabotage an arbitration.  Moreover, postpon-
ing jurisdictional motions may preserve judicial resources.  Judges need not get
involved if the case is settled or decided in a way acceptable to both sides.  If
the case does not settle, judges may receive the benefit of an arbitrator’s discus-
sion and findings on the jurisdictional questions, particularly for international
cases where reasoned awards remain the norm.
The French rule has its cost, however.  A person who never agreed to
arbitrate may need to hedge bets by taking part in a bogus arbitration, at sub-
stantial cost of time and money.  Herein lies the proverbial fly in the Gallic
ointment:  Innocent respondents must wait until the end of proceedings to chal-
lenge even the most obvious jurisdictional defects.  While frivolous attacks on
arbitral authority are sometimes used as a delaying tactic, unwarranted arbitra-
tions also pose their own risk.  Believing its chances better in arbitration than in
court, a claimant playing hardball might bring an arbitral proceeding with weak
jurisdictional foundation, hoping for an easy win that will exert undue settle-
ment pressure.
Out of fairness, a rapid and summary mechanism should exist to permit
courts to halt proceedings when the arbitration clause is manifestly void or
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clearly against public policy.  Without some evidence of a valid arbitration
agreement, the respondent’s burden of costly hearings (a possible default award
being the only alternative) usually outweighs any societal benefit from reducing
dilatory tactics in other cases.  An arbitration would go forward only if a court
has been prima facie satisfied of the validity and application of the arbitration
clause (no forgery or gun at the head during signing), subject to more extensive
review at the award stage.
Moving from the timing of judicial intervention to the finality of an arbi-
trators’ jurisdictional rulings, observers will note the need for nuanced naviga-
tion between two extremes.  One resides in a lack of judicial rigor in examining
the validity of agreements to arbitrate questions of arbitrator jurisdiction.  The
other lies in blanket rejection of all such clauses, no matter how clearly the
evidence might support their validity in a given factual context.
Arbitrators should never be given jurisdiction on the basis of a mere con-
tract recital (such as “the arbitrator has jurisdiction over all questions”), absent
verification of the true consent of the party sought to be bound.  That being
said, the concern that contracts will be misinterpreted need not lead to a public
policy that bans all forms of jurisdictional clauses in arbitration.  Legitimate
bargains should not be trumped by fears of occasional abuse.
While not entirely free from doubt, the American cases are probably get-
ting things more right than wrong.  While exceptions exist, judges in the United
States seem to be asking the correct question:  What did the litigants actually
agree to arbitrate?  On public policy issues, of course, arbitrators can never be
empowered to make binding determinations.  Judicial review will in all events
involve examination of the validity of the initial agreement, allegedly granting
the arbitrators power on questions related to their authority.  Such agreements
will be most plausible when related to jurisdictional matters such as the time
limits, scope of procedural powers, and range of issues submitted to arbitration.
When one side challenges the very existence of an arbitration clause, the
arbitrators’ authority does not always yield to routine presumptions.  Many
cases present their own peculiar facts and issues.  Was the arbitration clause
forged or signed with a gun at the head?  Did the corporate officer who exe-
cuted the contract have power to commit the company?  With respect to such
questions, the supervisory court must be satisfied of the parties’ informed and
explicit consent (normally in the form of a distinct second agreement) to submit
the precise jurisdictional question to arbitration.
In all these lines of inquiry, legal maxims can facilitate analysis by com-
municating general norms quickly.  The expressions lose their value, however,
if subject to the type of thoughtless mimicry that parrots perform.  When law-
yers invoke contract recitals divorced from context, much as wizards incant
magic words, the result is a voodoo jurisprudence that has no place in a healthy
legal system.  The articulation of workable standards requires thoughtful analy-
sis by policy-makers and practitioners aiming toward an arbitral system that
gives effect to the parties’ legitimate expectations about what questions are
subject to binding arbitration.
